Will Hu's reforms be undone by his personality cult?

From HU MOVES TO EXERT ADDED CONTROL OVER PLA By Willy Lam

President Hu Jintao has adroitly played the disciplinary and anti-corruption cards to boost his stature in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) as well as to exercise control over the top brass. Given that a large-scale reshuffle of the policy-setting Central Military Commission (CMC) is due at the 17th Communist Party Congress next year, officers formerly deemed close to ex-president Jiang Zemin have been currying favor with the current leader.

After adopting a relatively low profile since taking over the CMC chairmanship from Jiang in late 2004, Hu has taken aggressive steps to enhance his clout over perhaps the one aspect of the polity on which his grip is least certain. Given ex-president Jiang’s notoriously cavalier attitude toward disciplinary lapses among military officers, it is not surprising that the new commander-in-chief should have chosen to assert his authority by cracking the whip on corruption and dereliction of duty...

Hu’s unusually speedy handling of these two incidents demonstrated a new style of leadership that is radically different from that of Jiang and even Jiang’s predecessor as CMC chairman, Deng Xiaoping. During Jiang’s 14 years as commander-in-chief, the PLA went through scandal after scandal...

A Beijing source close to the PLA said that Jiang turned a blind eye to the illicit activities perpetrated by the PLAN and other units because the then-commander-in-chief was aware that overall pay was too low and feared that he might face a revolt if both officers and enlisted personnel were denied a substantial “sideline income.” An additional reason underlying Jiang’s tardy handling of PLA-related economic crimes was that many of the crimes were committed by the sons of senior cadres, including those who were the ex-president’s associates or members of his Shanghai Faction...

While Hu, who only became CMC chairman less than two years ago, has failed to establish close personal ties with the top brass, he is hoping to impress officers with his no-nonsense style...

...under Jiang, General Xu, a former chief political commissar whose responsibilities included “making propaganda,” played a pivotal role in erecting a quasi-personality cult around the Third-Generation leader. For the past year, however, General Xu has begun to ingratiate himself with Hu. Earlier this month, the chief military propagandist wrote a long article in commemoration of the publication of the Selected Works of Jiang Zemin. In theory, the general was heaping praise on Jiang’s “revolutionary spirit, wisdom and boldness as a Marxist statesman, military expert and tactician.” The 5,500-character essay, however, cited Hu 10 times, and was replete with calls to “rally behind the Party Leadership with comrade Hu Jintao as General Secretary” (People’s Daily, September 16). It is evident that even while apparently eulogizing Jiang, General Xu placed an emphasis on glorifying the “supremo of the day.”

At the same time, Commander-in-chief Hu is consolidating his grip over the People’s Armed Police (PAP), sometimes called the “third pillar” in China’s labyrinthine military-cum-security apparatus. While the authorities have never publicized either the budget or the staff establishment of this paramilitary police force, it is estimated that the PAP has nearly one million men and women in uniform. Given that this formidable force is in charge of maintaining law and order in the cities and countryside as well as looking after the safety of senior party and state leaders, Hu could not afford to lose the personal loyalty of PAP officers; the CMC recently announced that 28 PAP officers had been promoted to the rank of major general (Xinhua, August 29). This unexpectedly large number has meant that unlike the regular PLA, this special force is still expanding, enabling Hu to install more of his protégés in key slots.

While Hu’s fast-expanding clout in the military and security apparatus may spell stability for the country—and for economic development—the president has already betrayed tendencies of building a personality cult around himself. Hardly a day passes without major media such as CCTV, Xinhua, People’s Daily and Jiefangjun Bao extolling one aspect or another of the Fourth-Generation titan’s extraordinary abilities or exploits. This hardly bodes well for the success of a number of reforms, particularly those relating to the modernization of political and governmental institutions and structures that Hu promised the nation when he first stepped into the limelight almost four years ago.